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IntroductIon
Hierarchy, Value, and the Value of Hierarchy
Naomi Haynes and Jason Hickel
Abstract: Many of the communities in which anthropologists work are 
hierarchically organized, and the people who live in them often describe 
this arrangement in positive terms. Nevertheless, anthropologists rarely 
paint hierarchy in a favorable light. This special issue aims to question 
this tendency with ethnographic insights into social contexts where hier-
archy is regarded as a desirable social good. By way of an introduction 
to the research articles, we explore those aspects of Western thought 
that make it difficult for anthropologists to take hierarchy seriously. In 
addition, we develop an interpretive approach that treats hierarchy both 
as a relational form and as a theoretical model—that is, as a framework 
for understanding value—drawing in part on our own ethnographic 
research in southern Africa.
Keywords: hierarchy, individualism, liberalism, Louis Dumont, social 
organization, southern Africa, value
Modern man is virtually incapable of fully recognizing [hierarchy]. For a start, he 
simply fails to notice it. If it does force itself on his attention he tends to eliminate 
it as an epiphenomenon. Should he finally accept it, as I did, he must still take 
pains to see it as it really is, without attributing imaginary properties to it. By 
contrast, all the difficulties vanish if we keep it firmly before our eyes, accustom 
ourselves to following its outlines and implications, and rediscover the universe 
in which it operates. (Dumont ([1970] 1980: xlvii)
Hierarchy is not the sort of thing one typically hears Western academics describe 
in positive terms. There are both political and intellectual reasons why this is so. 
With regard to the former, it is not difficult to see that the notion of hierarchy 
runs straight against the grain of the liberal sensibilities that most scholars share, 
and placing hierarchy in a favorable light therefore seems to fly in the face of 
these core political commitments. In terms of the latter, in the current intellectual 
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climate, perhaps particularly in anthropology, we are still struggling to get past 
the preoccupation with power that has been central to disciplinary thought over 
the past two decades. As Marshall Sahlins (2004: 138–154) has pointed out, this 
orientation has produced a reductive overemphasis on the subject, which in 
turn has made it difficult to take cultural systems, including those characterized 
by hierarchy, seriously (also see Rio and Smedal 2009b: 2–3). As Sahlins (2004: 
149) puts it, under these intellectual circumstances such systems “appear as 
the political cum intellectual enemy,” monuments to structures of power that, 
when compared to “the experience-near, embodied world of excluded subjects, 
demanding their own identities and contesting the authoritative narratives of the 
larger society,” seem like inflexible anachronisms. 
Despite these barriers to treating hierarchy as a serious object of study, 
much less as a positive social phenomenon, we believe that as anthropologists 
we cannot ignore this topic. This is true first and foremost because many of 
the communities in which we work are organized hierarchically, and people 
in these communities often represent hierarchy in positive terms (see, e.g., 
Ansell 2010; Ferguson 2013; Haynes 2012; Hickel 2015; Iteanu 2013; King 2014; 
Scherz 2014; Smith 2007). While individualism and egalitarianism are central 
to Western conceptions of justice and the good, many people in hierarchical 
societies see them as immoral and destructive, as eroding the relationships that 
make meaningful personhood possible. Our primary aims in this special issue 
are therefore to explore a variety of ethnographic contexts in which hierarchy 
is portrayed as desirable and to examine the role of hierarchy in people’s efforts 
to produce a social world that reflects their understanding of a good society 
(Robbins 2013a). Situating hierarchy in local conceptions of the good life in 
turn opens the way for us to speak not only of hierarchical social organization 
but also of values. This connection is most immediately evident in the fact that 
when people speak positively of hierarchy, they are speaking about what they 
value. Even more fundamentally, hierarchy draws our attention to the way that 
values are organized with respect to each other, since values are hierarchically 
ranked, with some being more important than others. Hierarchy is therefore a 
central component of any theory of value (Dumont [1970] 1980: 20). 
In light of these observations, our goal in this special issue is twofold. First, 
as an ethnographic project, this issue foregrounds hierarchy as a mode of social 
organization, building on a solid foundation of important work (Mosko and 
Jolly 1994; Peacock 2015; Rio and Smedal 2009a) in an effort to expand our 
understanding of the sorts of relational worlds that, for reasons we describe in 
more detail below, anthropologists have found difficult to engage in empathetic 
terms. Second, we seek to explore the central position of hierarchy in the pro-
cess and production of value. Here again we build on previous discussions in 
the discipline, where the topic of value is enjoying something of a revival (see, 
e.g., Eriksen 2012; Graeber 2001; Otto and Willerslev 2013; Pedersen 2008; Rob-
bins 1994, 2004, 2015). In what follows, then, we address hierarchy both as a 
mode of social organization and as a model for social theory, while also seeking 
out connections between these two approaches. Our goal is to cultivate a con-
versation around the issue of hierarchy animated by difficult questions. Why, 
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for instance, should anthropologists—and especially young scholars interested 
in the neo-liberal moment—be concerned with hierarchy? What is the place of 
hierarchy in contemporary social theory? How are we to think about reasser-
tions of hierarchy in the era of globalization? How have people leveraged ideas 
about hierarchy in order to challenge liberal models of the social good? More 
specifically, how have societies reimagined and reconfigured the ideas and 
institutions of Christianity, democracy, and development—which have figured 
so often in social theory as forces for egalitarianism and individualism—to suit 
their own hierarchical values and goals? And how has hierarchy itself been 
retooled, reinvigorated, and restructured, especially in contexts of social change 
and conjuncture? 
In this introduction, we offer a theoretical framework for these questions, 
which are variously engaged by the authors featured in this special issue. We 
begin by specifying what we mean by hierarchy and then go on to consider why 
this topic is especially difficult for contemporary Western scholars, in particular, 
to think with. We follow this discussion with some short ethnographic examples 
from our own work in southern Africa that illustrate the importance of hierar-
chy in the specific contexts of Christian practice and political democratization. 
These examples then open the way for a brief treatment of the topic of value. 
We conclude by providing an overview of the various contributions to this issue. 
Dealing with Dumont
As we turn our attention to developing a definition of hierarchy, we begin by 
positioning ourselves in relationship to the theorist whose work has unques-
tionably had the greatest impact on anthropological engagement with this 
topic. We have already invoked Louis Dumont in the epigraph above, and his 
influence is evident throughout this issue.1 Beyond the fact that most of the 
contributions engage with Dumont directly, this introduction is also indebted 
to his work. That said, we want to make clear from the outset an important dis-
tinction between our analysis and that offered by Dumont. While we recognize 
the merit of Dumont’s holism, not least as an analytic device that brings many 
of the unquestioned assumptions of Western individualism to the fore, in the 
discussion that follows we hope to avoid the confusion that the tight coupling 
of holism and hierarchy in Dumont’s anthropology sometimes creates by draw-
ing a distinction between what we mean by hierarchy as a model of value and 
hierarchy as a social form. 
In Dumont’s work, hierarchy and holism are inextricably linked. This is 
because hierarchy for Dumont is defined by what he terms ‘encompassment’ and 
more specifically encompassment “of the contrary” (Dumont 1986: 252; see also 
Dumont [1970] 1980: 240). By this he is referring to the relationship between a 
whole and its parts; the latter are at once constitutive of and, as such, identical 
to the whole, and yet they are different from and, as such, contrary to it.2 Hierar-
chy therefore presupposes a whole. In a detailed discussion of Dumont’s holism, 
Bruce Kapferer (2010) notes that for Dumont the whole is not social or territorial. 
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It does not, in other words, connote the boundaries of a society or community 
but is instead ideological: it is a system of ranked and competing values. Kapferer 
thus views Dumont’s holism as a methodology aimed at the comparative study 
of ideology across a large swath of human existence—a method “that assumes 
that values in relations are never balanced or equivalent … but hierarchical 
when conceived through and defined in relation to the whole” (ibid.: 198–199). 
Given Kapferer’s clarifications, so far we find little to disagree with in Dumont. 
The notion of hierarchy more generally is fundamental to any theory of value, 
and toward the development of such a theory hierarchical encompassment is a 
compelling idea. Nevertheless, we are cautious about taking up Dumont’s work 
for several reasons. First, at least some readers will feel that Dumont has found 
in non-Western societies not only a point of contrast to the modern West, but 
also, and more problematically, a perennial past in the present (Appadurai 1988; 
Fabian 1983). Faced with such critiques, one employs Dumont’s theory only at 
the risk of being thought guilty by association of a neo-colonialist conceit. So 
too, while we find it helpful to explore values in terms of hierarchical encom-
passment, we want to keep our distance from a reading of Dumont that cites his 
occasional references to a ‘paramount value’ (Dumont 1986) as evidence that 
all values can ultimately be reduced to one.3 Finally, and most importantly for 
the purposes of this issue, we must make clear that the definition of hierarchy 
that Dumont puts forward for values—hierarchy as encompassment—is not the 
same as the definition of hierarchy that we will be using when we speak of it as 
a social form. This requires a bit of explanation. 
For Dumont, social hierarchy comes from a kind of holism that is very dif-
ferent from the ideological holism we have just described. In this second usage, 
the whole is not “an analyst’s construction” but rather “a conception in the 
indigenous culture” (Robbins 1994: 31). Here, the integrity of the whole is the 
central concern behind much, if not all, of social life, and the latter is therefore 
organized in such a way as to reproduce and reorient the whole on terms that 
are ideologically salient, such as the religious notion of purity. Drawing on 
this socio-cultural definition of holism, it is no surprise that for Dumont social 
hierarchy is also marked by encompassment: in the case of India, lower castes 
are encompassed by higher castes so as to preserve the purity of the whole. It 
is in this interpretation of holism and hierarchy as social forms that we diverge 
from Dumont. Laying aside the vexed question of whether holism is indeed an 
indigenous conception in South Asia (we leave that to the regional specialists), 
we nevertheless want to make clear that while there may be cultural settings in 
which social hierarchy does take the form of encompassment, it is by no means 
necessary to define social hierarchy in these terms.4 Indeed, in this introduction 
we have chosen not to do so. Rather, our definition of hierarchy as a social form 
refers not to encompassment but rather to difference and asymmetry, and often 
also to rank. Examples from the ethnographic record of social hierarchy as we 
define it include the rich literature on ‘clientistic’ relationships (e.g., Eisenstadt 
and Roniger 1980), seniority (e.g., Pritchett 2001; Richards 1982), and what 
James Ferguson (2013) has recently called ties of ‘dependence’ (see also Barnes 
1967; Bolt 2014; Scherz 2014).5 In addition, we would note that based on this 
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definition it is possible for hierarchy to co-exist with a certain kind of ontologi-
cal egalitarianism. While in some cases hierarchical sociality presupposes basic 
ontological difference—that is, the people who inhabit different ranks in the 
system are considered to be fundamentally different types of beings, as in the 
caste system as Dumont describes it—in other cases people are regarded as 
ontologically equivalent, and the various ranks of the system are theoretically 
and often actually open to anyone. In such instances, ‘egalitarian hierarchy’ is 
not a contradiction in terms, but rather an important analytical descriptor. 
In keeping with our reading of Dumont as we have outlined it here, it should 
be clear that what is most interesting to us about hierarchical social arrange-
ments is the way that they reveal particular ideological arrangements, that is, 
topographies of value. Put differently, we might say that we are not simply 
interested in hierarchy as such, but rather in why hierarchy has emerged as 
so important in so many ethnographic contexts. Addressing this issue means 
engaging with value and, more specifically, with the values that hierarchical 
relationships express. In this way, while there are certainly parts of Dumont’s 
complicated apparatus that we leave behind or do not take up, our discussion 
in this introduction is offered very much in the spirit of Dumont, both in the 
connections we draw between social forms and values and in our insistence 
on the structuring influence and hierarchical arrangement of the latter. It is in 
a similar spirit that we now turn our attention to a more detailed discussion of 
the problems that attention to hierarchy—and particularly attention to hierarchy 
as a moral good—raises in contemporary anthropology.
The Problem of Hierarchy
We are by no means the first anthropologists to observe that hierarchy rep-
resents an uncomfortable topic for the discipline. As Dumont’s words have 
already reminded us, hierarchy has for decades presented a problem to modern, 
Western anthropologists. One of the reasons for this is that anthropology—and 
particularly American cultural anthropology—is very firmly rooted in the clas-
sic liberal tradition that underpins Western academia. Kant’s enlightenment 
mantra (“Dare to be wise!”) called for individuals to exercise their own capacity 
for critical thought without relying on the guidance of establishment authority 
figures and to question the conventional wisdom that such figures hand down. 
“For true enlightenment,” Kant said, “all that is needed is freedom.” Anthropol-
ogy has taken up this enlightenment project and added its own spin, drawing on 
the perspectives of other cultures to gain distance from the entrenched assump-
tions and taken-for-granted values of our own. Indeed, many of the Boasians 
believed that this cross-cultural relativist stance provided the anthropologist 
with a sort of transcendence from the cognitive limitations of any single culture 
and therefore a special degree of freedom. 
Yet it is not only their own freedom that anthropologists have been concerned 
to achieve, but also that of others. We can see this even in the early stages of the 
discipline’s history. The Boasian tradition began in large part as an anti-racist 
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project—an ambitious attempt to upend the dominant social hierarchies that 
characterized early-twentieth-century America. More recently, anthropologists 
have been at the forefront of challenging gender hierarchies and other social 
inequalities, both at home and abroad. It is for these reasons that anthropology 
departments across the world have developed a reputation for being bastions 
of progressive thought and action. At the heart of this movement is a concern, 
once again, for human freedom, conceived as the emancipation of the suffering 
subject (cf. Robbins 2013a) from the constraints of oppressive social norms, of 
which hierarchies of race and gender seem to be the most troubling. On a more 
abstract theoretical level, we can see this concern for freedom reflected in the 
long-standing debates that anthropologists have engaged in over the tension 
between structure and agency (cf. Obeyesekere 1992; Sahlins 1995), with the 
contemporary consensus leaning heavily toward the latter—a stance that is as 
much political as analytical. As we pointed out above, the analytical project of 
recognizing and describing the agency of the subject against the material and 
symbolic structures that ‘constrain’ or overdetermine agency runs parallel to the 
political project of emancipating the subject by challenging hierarchies. 
In other words, a deep tension exists in liberal thought between the value of 
individual freedom, on the one hand, and the social hierarchies that are thought 
to constrain freedom, on the other. In light of this tension, we need to ask 
ourselves, why are freedom and hierarchy regarded as incompatible? We argue 
that it has to do with the particularly Western conception of freedom that this 
formulation assumes. Webb Keane’s work offers insights into how this plays 
out. Demonstrating that the dominant Western conception of freedom—that 
which underpins narratives of modernity and progress—focuses on human 
emancipation as a project of progressive self-mastery, Keane (2007: 6) states: 
“If in the past humans were in thrall to illegitimate rulers, rigid traditions, and 
unreal fetishes, as they become modern they realize the true character of human 
agency. Conversely, those who seem to persist in displacing their own agency 
onto such rulers, traditions, or fetishes are out of step with the times, anachro-
nistic premoderns or antimoderns.” Liberation, in other words, is conceived as 
the emancipation of the individual from the arbitrary authority of others. 
This conception of freedom presupposes a fundamental dichotomy between 
the individual and society. The individual is regarded as the proper locus of 
reason and the source of ‘authentic’ desire. The individual exists prior to soci-
ety, which is imagined as a series of external constraints. Social norms, rules, 
values, and beliefs are thought to overdetermine the desires of individuals and 
appear as a form of bondage. The process of liberation, then, involves excavat-
ing and asserting the inner autonomous agency of the individual. It is, above all, 
a process of self-realization. These assumptions about the tension between the 
individual and society appear repeatedly in Western social science (Sahlins 2008) 
and, in various iterations, inform the work of Hegel, Freud, and much of the 
structural functionalist tradition. Indeed, they even seem to inform Marx’s theory 
of ideology: the ‘false consciousness’ handed down by society—which reflects 
the interests of a ruling class—precludes objective knowledge of the external 
world and therefore stifles the expression of true political agency and desire. 
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In view of all this, it becomes clear why hierarchy poses a problem for the 
liberal conception of freedom: it represents an arrangement wherein persons 
are embedded in relations of interdependence that appear to hamper their pros-
pects for self-mastery. The subject entangled in hierarchies appears as the 
antithesis of the modern political subject—the disembedded, free-thinking, 
rights-bearing individual. 
We know, of course, that these assumptions are incorrect. The subject does 
not precede society or social norms but is in fact formed through those norms. 
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler are often credited with pointing this out, but 
it is an observation that is nearly as old as anthropology itself. Persons do not 
exist outside of social relationships—or, as the Boasians would have it, persons 
do not exist outside of culture. If this is the case, then the idea of agency—and 
of freedom—needs to be rethought. The subject’s capacity for agency does 
not inhere in some authentic inner self or a prior substratum of personhood. 
Rather, it is a product of the processes—the norms and the relationships, 
including hierarchical ones—that produce the subject in the first place. As 
Charles Taylor (1989: 33) has argued, human agency is what is possible within 
some given moral orientation rather than an absolute freedom from all orienta-
tions. Based on this viewpoint, we need to relativize our conception of agency 
to take into account choices that people make and desires that they hold which 
may not accord with our assumptions about what counts as liberation or resis-
tance (see, e.g., Frank 2006, Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Peacock 2013). 
As some of the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, hierarchy 
often provides a very powerful moral orientation for human action and desire. 
Indeed, in many cases it appears that people seek to re-establish the conditions 
for what they consider to be justice, well-being, and full human flourishing by 
constituting or reconstituting hierarchies rather than by seeking to abolish them. 
This seems to be increasingly true when people are confronted with alternative 
models of society and personhood. Christianity, democracy, and development, 
for example, often seek to challenge pre-existing social structures and values, 
many of which are hierarchical. It is at these conjunctures, when hierarchy is 
called into question, that it is often most vehemently defended and, as a result, 
most clearly articulated. This presents a challenge to the standard narrative of 
globalization. Rather than creating communities of liberal cosmopolitans, glo-
balizing forces such as democracy and development often produce what Meyer 
and Geschiere (1999) have called ‘cultural closure’—new longings for forms of 
social order that often pivot on the value of hierarchy, whether as a social form, 
as an ideology, or as nostalgia for an idealized past. 
But cultural closure along these lines happens not only ‘out there’; it also 
takes place in the West itself, often giving way to social movements that provoke 
scholars’ own political reactions. In the United States, for instance, we see this 
sort of cultural closure among conservatives who express longing to return to 
the putative ‘Golden Age’ of the American family with its stable gender hierar-
chies (Ginsburg 1989). In Europe, it appears in the form of right-wing nation-
alist groups that seek to reassert racial hierarchies as a supposed solution to 
economic crisis. It may be that these more familiar, experience-near expressions 
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of hierarchy are driving the renewed interest in the subject among Western 
scholars today. Or perhaps it is being driven by the recognition that Western 
society is marked by inequality to an unprecedented degree, yielding a highly 
stratified social order, reminiscent of feudalism, that some pundits have sought 
to portray as a ‘natural’ hierarchy (e.g., Clark 2014). 
How are we to think about ideologies or social movements that reject lib-
eral values in this manner and instead express a preference for hierarchies? 
Confronted with such situations where class struggle is at stake, progressives 
and leftists tend to resort to explanations that rely on theories of false con-
sciousness. Even when class struggle is not a factor, it can be tempting to say 
that when people represent hierarchy favorably, they are merely reproducing 
an ideology promoted by those on the ‘senior’ end of the scale—men, elders, 
and patrons—to perpetuate the subservience of those on the ‘junior’ end of 
the scale—women, minors, and clients (e.g., Crehan 1997). These explica-
tions are not entirely without merit, but they often assume that there is some-
thing intrinsic to humans that should predispose them to reject hierarchy—an 
assumption that we would argue does not always bear out ethnographically. 
Such explanations ignore the possibility that in some contexts people might 
actually regard hierarchy as central to their conceptions of the good and to their 
ideas about human flourishing. To paraphrase the words of Saba Mahmood 
(2005: xi), we cannot arrogantly assume that liberal forms of life exhaust ways 
of living meaningfully and richly in this world. We have to be able to parochial-
ize our own political certitude.
On Wanting Hierarchy (Back): Two Examples from Southern Africa
Southern Africa—where the two of us have conducted fieldwork for many 
years, and where our interest in hierarchy first emerged—provides a productive 
context in which to consider some of these issues. The two case studies we 
discuss here, from South Africa and Zambia, admittedly represent a narrow geo-
graphical and cultural focus. However, our observations can be read back on the 
articles in this issue that engage other regions as a means of expanding—and 
doubtless challenging—the framework presented in the introduction. 
During the decade leading up to South Africa’s first democratic elections in 
1994, it became clear that not all black South Africans necessarily wanted to 
sign on to the vision of a liberal democratic future as promoted by the African 
National Congress (ANC). In rural Zululand, large numbers of people were so 
disturbed by the prospect that they mobilized vigilante militias under the banner 
of the Inkatha Freedom Party in an attempt to sabotage the ANC-led revolution. 
While they embraced the principles of racial equality and universal franchise, 
many questioned the underlying idea that all individuals are autonomous and 
ontologically equal—especially in relation to gender and kinship hierarchies. 
This skepticism persists today. As Hickel (2012, 2015) has argued, many peo-
ple who retain deep ties to rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal perceive liberalism as 
a threat to the hierarchical social order that remains crucial to their conceptions 
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of fruition and collective well-being. By equalizing individuals across bound-
aries of gender and generation, liberalism dismantles kinship hierarchies and 
reduces the world to a state of sterile sameness that opens the door to serious 
misfortunes. Dismantle hierarchies, they say, and the very foundations of social 
reproduction fall apart. Many in rural KwaZulu-Natal believe that the increasing 
poverty and unemployment rates that characterize contemporary South Africa—
which we might regard as the consequence of the government’s embrace of 
neo-liberal economic policies—are due rather to the liberal social policies that 
the ANC promotes under the banner of development and progress. People who 
hold this view seek to restore their good fortune by ritually re-establishing or 
reasserting hierarchies in the home, specifically through the sacrifice of cattle 
and the distribution of meat. 
It is tempting to regard this position—this valorization of hierarchy—as 
flowing from a sort of primordial location, a holdover from a premodern past. 
In fact, it is a wholly modern phenomenon. Hickel (2015) shows that the 
hierarchical order cherished by rural Zulus proceeds in part from the Native 
Administration policies of late colonialism, which governed rural areas by 
imposing a set of so-called customary laws that ossified hierarchies as a way 
of extending control into the minutiae of domestic life. Today, the rules of 
hierarchy are often naturalized as ‘traditional’, even though evidence suggests 
that social order in pre-colonial Natal was a good deal more flexible. This point 
serves as a cautionary tale in our present discussion. Contrary to the develop-
mentalist trajectory presupposed by thinkers like Maine and de Tocqueville, 
and to some extent Dumont, hierarchy can be just as modern as individualism 
or egalitarianism.
Turning our attention to another ethnographic case from southern Africa, 
we are given a further example in which hierarchy is reasserted in the face of 
individualized egalitarianism. Christianity, particularly in its Protestant guises, 
has historically been associated with egalitarianism and individualism. Weber, 
Mauss, Dumont, and Foucault have been the most important thinkers behind 
this idea, and recent work in the anthropology of Christianity has often—
although not always—emphasized the individualist and egalitarian thrust of 
this religion (see, e.g., Robbins 2004; cf. Daswani 2011). Pentecostalism, a form 
of Protestantism that has witnessed exponential growth across the globe in 
recent decades, takes Christian egalitarianism still further through its emphasis 
on spiritual gifts such as prophecy and glossolalia. Because Pentecostals take 
seriously the biblical promise that the Holy Spirit will be poured out on “all 
flesh” (Joel 2: 28), regardless of age or sex, from a theological perspective theirs 
is among the most egalitarian forms of Christianity. Indeed, in at least some 
instances, Pentecostal adherence has meant the breaking down of pre-existing 
social hierarchies, especially those of seniority (van Dijk 1992). 
Despite the egalitarian impulse of Pentecostalism, however, in many parts 
of the world the most important social ties developed in Pentecostal groups are 
structured by hierarchies of charismatic authority. This is certainly the case on 
the Zambian Copperbelt, where the key relationship in Pentecostal congrega-
tions is that between leaders and laypeople. As Haynes has argued in greater 
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detail elsewhere (Haynes 2012, forthcoming), these ties are hierarchical and 
are often framed in terms of one of the most salient hierarchies in Zambia—
that of generation—as on the Copperbelt pastors are regularly referred to as 
‘parents’ (bafyashi). What this very brief ethnographic outline suggests is that 
in Copperbelt Pentecostalism hierarchy emerges as a clear choice in the face 
of other models of social organization. Yet we must also bear in mind that the 
Pentecostal preference for hierarchy does not mean that there is no place for 
egalitarian relationships. While much of Pentecostal life is devoted to creating 
and maintaining hierarchical ties between leaders and laypeople, the egalitar-
ian ‘charismatic space’ of Pentecostal ritual (Eriksen 2014) allows existing 
hierarchies to be broken down or replaced when necessary, for instance, if they 
become corrupted by unwelcome economic interests (Haynes 2015). In this 
case, egalitarianism is made to serve hierarchical ends, but it has not for that 
reason ceased to be an important part of Pentecostal social life.
The foregoing examples, along with the various contributions to this special 
issue, provide a clear illustration of the sort of social movements we invoked 
above. Having had direct encounters with liberalism or individualism, and hav-
ing been presented with spaces in which they could legitimately organize their 
social lives according to these principles, the groups and communities we have 
just described have chosen another way. In these cases, hierarchy is regarded 
as socially desirable, and a social world where at least some key relationships 
are hierarchical is considered a good to be pursued. Expressed in this way, we 
can begin to think of hierarchy in relation to value, and it is to this topic that 
we now turn. 
Hierarchy, Value, and Values
Anthropological discussions of value often begin by outlining the various ways 
in which this term has been used in the discipline (see, e.g., Graeber 2001: 
1–22; Miller 2008: 1122–1123; Otto and Willerslev 2013: 1–2). These differences 
are most simply described by the distinction between ‘value’ (use, exchange, 
economic) and ‘values’ (family, cultural, religious, aesthetic). Following David 
Graeber (2013: 224), who suggests that there is more commonality than dif-
ference between value and values so defined, we would like to reframe this 
distinction as one between ‘value’ as a verb and ‘value’ as a noun.6 The notion 
of value as a verb refers to the process of valuing and encompasses not only 
structuralist theories of value—what Graeber (2001: 2), drawing on Saussure, 
calls “‘value’ … as ‘meaningful difference’”—but also economic theories of 
value, which are about equivalence, exchange, and so forth. In contrast, value 
as a noun refers to notions of the good. While this concept certainly may have 
moral implications, the most important feature of the good as an ethnographic 
object (as opposed to a philosophical one) is its connection to a certain model 
of sociality: values are ideas about a good social and relational world. 
Understood in these terms, values as nouns can be defined as those parts 
of culture that transform the constellation of relationships, actions, and objects 
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that we find in any society from a neutral field of open-ended potential to a 
field that is differentiated, a field with topography. Simply put, values value. 
Stated yet another way, the good structures the move from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, 
from difference to value, and therefore serves as the metric that animates the 
process of valuation—values as verbs. Without some notion of the good, it is 
hard to understand why someone would choose to exchange taro with a per-
son in a neighboring village, or to build a table to sell to someone else, or to 
buy that same table. Nor can we see why people would prefer to marry their 
cross-cousins, or to regard men as more important than women, or to pursue 
hierarchical forms of social organization in the face of other options. These 
actions are rendered sensible in a framework of values that exists beyond the 
purely material or structural—a point that Sahlins (1976) has made very well. 
Joel Robbins (2004, 2009) has provided a detailed description of what this 
process of valuation looks like in his work on the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea. 
For the Urapmin, a good social world is one that is characterized by the formation 
and maintenance of egalitarian social relationships, which are in turn fundamen-
tal to Melanesian models of the person (Strathern 1988). Following Dumont, Rob-
bins therefore argues that the value that he calls ‘relationalism’ determines the 
position of all other elements of Urapmin society.7 This means that those ideas, 
institutions, or practices that most effectively produce relationships are more 
prominent, “more elaborately worked out” (Robbins 2009: 66), than those that 
do not. Here again, the particular hierarchical ordering of values as nouns—that 
is, the particular model of the good—found in a given community is responsible 
for the arrangement of all sorts of other things: the kinds of relationships people 
pursue, the objects they choose to display, the rituals they perform. The arrange-
ment of values in a particular society thus reverberates through it in numerous 
visible ways, which means that values are observable in social life, as values 
“find their existence in people” (Rio and Smedal 2009b: 20).
A final thing to bear in mind when examining how values are organized 
is the possibility that this order can change. One can infer this not only from 
Dumont’s (1986) work on the emergence of individualism in the West (see 
also Robbins 2013b), but also from Weber’s (1946: 323–359) notion of value 
‘spheres’, in which various domains of value—religious, political, aesthetic—
compete for superior positions of influence. In the cases provided above, we 
have seen how this competition can involve the position of hierarchy in the con-
stellation of elements that make up a particular society. Similarly, it is important 
to pay attention to when and where hierarchy is elaborated. In most cases, hier-
archy does not define all social contexts. In the examples from southern Africa 
discussed earlier, people might demonstrate a strong preference for hierarchy 
within the family or the church but reject it in other social spaces. To value 
hierarchy in some scenarios does not preclude an egalitarian ethic in others. 
It should be clear in these southern African examples that hierarchy is central 
to local models of a good society. This does not mean, however, that hierarchy 
is a good in and of itself, but rather that hierarchy is a good because it is part 
of a larger ideological framework of value. In the case of rural KwaZulu-Natal, 
for instance, hierarchy is valued as a means to fruition—to the achievement 
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of health and good fortune and the conditions for social reproduction (Hickel 
2015). Indeed, in many cases people neglect kinship hierarchies until their 
fortunes take a turn for the worse, at which point they seek to police them 
with singular rigor. In the case of the Copperbelt, the importance of hierarchy 
follows from its connection to what Haynes (forthcoming) calls ‘moving’. On 
the Copperbelt, moving refers to measurable advancement, whether progress 
through the life-course in the form of marriage and children or upward mobility 
indexed by consumer goods, from a new suit to a second-hand Toyota sedan. 
For Pentecostals, it also carries spiritual components. Importantly, moving does 
not refer to progress as such, but to a larger social process in which personal 
advancement is achieved through social relationships. Put differently, moving 
is not so much a matter of getting ahead as it is of being pulled up. There are 
multiple relational forms through which moving can be realized, but the most 
important of these are ties of patronage or hierarchical ‘dependence’ (Ferguson 
2013), which facilitate moving especially well. Hierarchy is therefore important 
to people on the Copperbelt as a means of realizing local models of a good 
social world—in this case, a world in which everyone is moving. 
The foregoing discussion has provided a framework through which to 
approach the remaining contributions to this special issue. While different arti-
cles address different aspects of the model we have developed here, and while 
they vary in their theoretical orientation, one nevertheless sees the thread of 
value running through these discussions of hierarchy.
Overview of Contributions
Signe Howell’s article provides an excellent illustration of the sort of contest of 
values that we have already seen in the Copperbelt and Zulu cases. In the Lio 
example that Howell describes, the conflict between hierarchical and egalitar-
ian social systems reveals that egalitarianism has been incorporated into Lio 
society without being allowed to transform it in any significant way. Traditional 
Lio social organization is hierarchical, and the authority of priest-leaders struc-
tures a political-religious system that Howell, using Dumont’s terms, refers to as 
‘holist’. With the arrival of Catholicism, Lio hierarchy has been challenged by 
an egalitarianism that emphasizes individual relationships with God (Dumont 
1986). Identification with the Catholic Church has become important to the Lio 
primarily as a means of interacting with the state, as national identity cards 
require Indonesian citizens to indicate their affiliation with one of five world 
religions. Lio also participate in a circumscribed set of Catholic rituals, narrowly 
defined according to the category of ‘religion’. Nevertheless, Howell argues that 
hierarchy remains the encompassing value, as Catholic egalitarianism is allowed 
to order only less important domains of Lio life—in this case, the small, discrete 
category of ‘religion’ or occasional interactions with the state. Howell suggests 
that, ironically, the subordinate role given to religion, which clearly falls short 
of the Catholic ideal of conversion, presents a striking parallel to the way that 
post–Vatican II efforts toward ‘inculturation’ have treated culture. To wit, culture 
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here is largely reduced to a set of constructed (mostly aesthetic) particles and 
objects, a few rituals, songs, and pieces of clothing—what Carneiro da Cunha 
calls “culture in quote marks” (cited in Vilaça 2014: S323). Just as Catholic 
practice has made culture into a reified and modular category, something to be 
encompassed by religion, Lio culture, as a totalizing system, has done the same 
with religion. For the Lio, then, a hierarchy that originated with their ancestors 
through the authority of priest-leaders remains the central mode of social orga-
nization, as well as, Howell adds, a model for the structure of values. 
Christianity also figures in the Ethiopian Orthodox case presented by Diego 
Maria Malara and Tom Boylston, although to very different effect. Here, Chris-
tianity serves as part of a larger relational framework that Malara and Boylston 
argue structures Amhara social life. This framework is fundamentally asym-
metrical and undergirds not only hierarchical patronage ties, which are familiar 
from the ethnographic literature on Ethiopia, but also intimate ties of love and 
care. Included here is the bond between a mother and child, as well as that 
between the Virgin Mary and Orthodox Christians. In both of these cases, love 
is asymmetrical because it is unconditional and can never be repaid. Love 
also enters into other asymmetrical ties through the work of mediators—often, 
again, mothers or the Virgin—who are willing and able to intercede on behalf 
of those they care for. It is in light of this model of ‘vertical love’ that Malara 
and Boylston are able to address the difficult question of whether we can think 
of hierarchy as an Amhara ‘value’ in the sense of a positive moral good. On the 
one hand, there is no question that hierarchy can lead to coercion and even 
exploitation. On the other, it is clear in Malara and Boylston’s analysis that 
hierarchy is linked to some of the most intimate and important relationships in 
Ethiopian Orthodox society, and this is the key to understanding the place of 
asymmetry in Amhara relational life. As the authors put it: “Without an account 
of vertical love and the daily practicalities of care and affection, it is difficult to 
see how a system based on naked domination, as Amhara is supposed to be, 
could ever be livable, or how claims about the values and virtues of hierarchy 
could ever be convincing.” In other words, if hierarchy is a value in Ethiopia, 
it is not because people are blind to its potentially negative effects or even sim-
ply because they enjoy the benefits of patronage. Rather, hierarchy is part of 
local models of the good because it is central to the politics of care, to the most 
important sites of intimacy and protection. 
Frederick Damon’s contribution takes a bold shot across time and space—
drawing on a number of classic anthropological texts and a variety of ethno-
graphic contexts—to examine the role that destruction and sacrifice play in the 
production of human hierarchies. Destruction, he states, seems necessary for the 
creation of difference, which allows for the elaboration of rank. He begins with 
the example of the Kula ring, the site of his own original research. In the Kula 
system, when one man sends a valuable to another, he destroys part of himself: 
the giver’s name ‘goes down’ (his body thereby depleted), while the receiver’s 
name ‘goes up’. In other words, exchange requires a kind of destruction, and 
destruction produces hierarchical difference. A similar logic operated in the past 
in Polynesia, Damon argues, where literal human sacrifice served as the basis for 
14   |   Naomi Haynes and Jason Hickel
hierarchy, and we can also see it at play in the lynching that became so common 
in the United States, especially the American South during the years following 
the Civil War, as a method of differentiating white from black. In each of these 
systems, continuity needs to be replaced by tangible discontinuity or differentia-
tion in order for some kind of hierarchized semantic field to exist. Destruction 
produces hierarchies, which are regarded as essential to a well-ordered social 
totality. Damon takes this one step further, arguing that we can understand the 
capitalist world system through this same lens. Why does the United States 
devote so much of its wealth to overdeveloping its military capacity? One might 
think of this as ‘waste’, but Damon suggests it is necessary to the continuity of 
the world system in two ways: it mops up overaccumulated capital in order to 
avoid widespread devaluation, and it maintains the relative ranking of hege-
monic positions. Mass destruction—be it wasting wealth on non-productive 
assets such as fighter planes or laying waste to entire cities—figures as a struc-
tural component of the modern world system. 
Stephan Feuchtwang’s article is equally ambitious in its scope. He mounts 
a fresh critique of the ahistorical and structuralist dimensions of Dumont’s 
approach to hierarchy with a corrective from another great French thinker, 
Dumont’s teacher Marcel Mauss. While Dumont asserts a type-anti-type dualism 
between hierarchical and egalitarian societies, Feuchtwang derives from Mauss’s 
theory of ‘civilization’—and from Dumont’s concepts of encompassment and 
ideology—an argument that all societies, including avowedly egalitarian ones, 
“hang together” on hierarchies of valuation, distinction, and aspiration. Indeed, 
Feuchtwang suggests that inasmuch as ideals of order, etiquette, civility, and so 
on are hierarchically organized and distinguished from the values of ‘others’ out-
side, hierarchy may even be intrinsic to the very concept of civilization—except 
in the case of specific hunter-gatherer civilizations. So much for Dumont’s 
dualism. As a corrective to Dumont’s tendency toward ahistorical analysis, 
Feuchtwang insists that anthropology should not shy away from exploring and 
analyzing the long processes by which hierarchies are formed and transformed 
through the history of specific civilizations. By way of example, he takes us on 
a dizzying tour through some 6,000 years of China’s history, moving from early 
forms of social hierarchy in the archaeological record to the rise of the imperial 
dynasties, illustrating how hierarchies have changed in that context, as has the 
idea of civilization itself. 
Arsalan Khan offers a thoughtful ethnography of the Tablighi Jamaat in Paki-
stan, a local instantiation of what has become the fastest growing Islamic move-
ment in the world. Tablighis are interesting in that they maintain a strong stance 
against the Islamist movement that has become so powerful in Pakistan. While 
Islamism seeks to use state power to legislate adherence to Islamic values, Tab-
lighis believe that such efforts are in vain. For them, the only way to draw Mus-
lims back to Islamic piety is through proper praxis, specifically a distinct form of 
face-to-face preaching known as dawat, which involves extensive traveling with 
groups of men going house-to-house across the country. Even if these mission-
ary efforts fail to refresh the religious commitments of others, they are important 
to the development of piety among the travelers themselves. Dawat is efficacious 
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toward this end, not only through the discipline and sacrifice that it requires, but 
also through the relationships that it produces. These relationships are hierarchi-
cal, modeled on kin relations between brothers and fathers with rankings laid 
out along a gradient of closeness to God. As Khan puts it: “Becoming a proper 
Islamic subject requires that a Tablighi must learn how to live in a hierarchi-
cally structured social world as both giver and recipient of Islamic knowledge.” 
Tablighis regard Islamist praxis, by contrast, as inefficacious because it stresses 
the agency and autonomy of the individual, and therefore produces persons 
who disregard their place in the hierarchical order. Because of this, Tablighis 
blame Islamism for disrupting the harmonious order of the family, causing 
moral chaos (fitna) in communities, and ultimately contributing to the general 
sense of violence and crisis that pervades Karachi today. 
Finally, Olaf Smedal’s discussion of hierarchy among the Ngadha of Flores, 
Indonesia, provides a helpful counter-example to many of the other cases 
treated here. Smedal describes the slow erosion of Ngadha hierarchy through 
the increasingly common practice of noble women marrying lower-ranking 
men. When this happens, a woman loses her rank and, more importantly, is not 
able to pass that rank along to her children. Although she can be ritually rein-
corporated into her family, as Smedal describes, a noble woman who has mar-
ried a commoner erases aristocratic distinction in the next generation. As more 
and more women find themselves in this position, the long-term dissolution of 
Ngadha hierarchy is not difficult to imagine. Instead of defending hierarchy as 
socially necessary, then, the Ngadha are slowly and painfully watching it slip 
away. Smedal is clear that this is not a rejection of hierarchy as such—at least, 
not on the part of the nobility, although commoners are generally happy enough 
with its passing. Rather, aristocratic hierarchy seems in this example to be a 
victim of its own inflexibility, particularly in view of Ngadha women’s increased 
access to education in other parts of the country, where they are unlikely to find 
marriage partners from the Ngadha nobility. Smedal suggests that the reason 
this shift is possible is that nobility was never necessary to the Ngadha social 
world in the first place—that while Ngadha sociality was structured by purity 
in a manner similar to Dumont’s description of India, the social classes that 
exemplified purity never encompassed the whole of Ngadha society. In this way, 
Smedal’s example provides a helpful complement to the definition of hierarchy 
that we have offered above by separating it from encompassment. 
Conclusion
While social scientists would agree that hierarchy operates in all places, there 
are few who place it at the center of their analysis, and fewer still who seek 
to understand it on its own terms, as part of a model of a good society. In 
this special issue, our aim is to do precisely that—to explore people’s insis-
tence that hierarchy is good for them and for their communities, and to do so 
in a framework that takes these ideas seriously. What we have found is that 
hierarchy is remarkably assertive and that in many places it is central to local 
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understandings of the good. This is not to say that hierarchy is not implicated 
in power relations; indeed, nearly all of the articles show that it is. However, 
hierarchy is much more than power and certainly much more than inequality. 
As we seek to move beyond, or at least to break new ground within, the 
concerns that have dominated the discipline for the past two decades—namely, 
those of power and resistance, especially in light of the global spread of 
neo-liberalism—the message of this special issue is that anthropologists will 
do well to keep hierarchy in view. This is not to say that it is not our business 
to expose and denounce injustice where we find it. On the contrary, what we 
are suggesting is that, at least in some instances, hierarchy may in fact be a key 
way of resisting the atomizing effects of liberalization in particular. And even in 
those instances where this is not specifically the case, the critical examination 
of liberalism that has made such an impact on anthropology in the recent past 
should highlight the importance of taking seriously seemingly illiberal, hierar-
chical ways of organizing social life and being in the world. As our discussion 
in this introduction and the contributions to this special issue make clear, what 
emerges from a whole range of social conjunctures is the fact that people seem 
to want hierarchy or, in some cases, to want their hierarchy back. Anthropology 
must do the difficult and politically contentious work of understanding why.
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Notes
 1. What we do not offer here is a close reading and summary of Dumont’s corpus, 
which would require another special issue in itself.
 2. One of Dumont’s favorite examples is that of ‘goods and services’. On the one hand, 
services are encompassed by goods as the dominant category, included with them as 
essentially part of the whole. On the other, services and goods are quite different from 
one another and, in that difference, contrary to each other (see Dumont 1986: 252).
 3. See Robbins (2013b) for an alternative reading of Dumont’s apparent ‘value monism’.
 4. Indeed, Greg Acciaioli (2009) has argued that the definition of hierarchy as encom-
passment in the revised 1980 edition of Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus does not fit 
well with the ethnographic material presented in the same volume, which instead 
suggests a model of hierarchy more similar to the one we propose here.
 5. In light of these examples, it may be that this definition works especially well with 
the material from southern Africa that we draw on in this introduction. Whether 
or not this is the case, we think that this definition of hierarchy is best suited to 
addressing those situations in which a preference for hierarchy is actively asserted, 
as people appear to be choosing hierarchical modes of social organization despite 
being confronted with other relational possibilities.
 6. Although he does not use this terminology, Graeber (2001) makes a similar argu-
ment in Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value in his sustained analysis of 
what he calls ‘action’ and ‘reflection’ that in many ways correspond to the notion 
of value as a verb and as a noun, respectively. Similarly, Michael Lambek’s (2013: 
155) brief discussion of Marx’s labor theory of value and Karl Polanyi’s notion of 
fictitious commodities points to this distinction. Naomi Haynes also makes this 
point in the introduction to her forthcoming book. 
 7. Making good use of Dumont’s ideological holism in this analysis, Robbins (2009) 
refers to relationalism as the ‘paramount value’ of the Urapmin.
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